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WHAT PRICE PEACE: FROM NUREMBERG TO
BOSNIA TO THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE
Malvina Halberstam •
In the fifty years that have elapsed since the Nuremberg Trials, we
have made tremendous progress in the development of human rights. The
Genocide Convention,1 the Convention on Civil and Political Rights,2 the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,3 the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; and the Convention
Against Torture5 have all been adopted by the United Nations and ratified
by the vast majority of states in the world. 6

•
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University Prepared
for presentation at the Panel on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law After Bosnia,
The International Law Weekend, New York, November 1, 1996. The author wishes to thank
Allan Blutstein, Cardozo 1997, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T .S. 277.
2.

International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.

171.
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S . 195.
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46,
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
5. International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1987) .
6. Some of these are now considered to be binding under customary law and even to
constitute jus cogens. See Jordan J. Paust, The Significance and Determination of Customary
International Human Rights Law: The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidence of Customary
Human Rights, 25 GA. 1. INT'L. & COMP. L. 147, 153 (1996) (noting that the prohibition of
genocide is a well-recognized peremptory norm of jus cogens); see also RESTATEMENT (fHIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 702, and cmts. d, f (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT); Jordan J. Paust, Symposium, The Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Avoiding 'Fraudulent ' Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-SelfExecution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1274 (1993)
(explaining that certain rights reflected in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have now
become peremptory norms of jus cogens); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International
Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed
Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1990) (noting that human rights values embodied in the
U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights are all elements of customary international law that are rapidly
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Treaties prohibiting various aspects of terrorism, such as hostage
taking,' airplane hijacking,' sabotage,9 seizure of ships on the high seas, 10
and attacks on diplomats, 11 have also been ratified by a large number of
states. 12 These Conventions, not only prohibit the conduct, but make it
criminal 13 or require states parties to make the conduct criminal under their
internal laws, 1• punishable by "severe penalties,"" and require any state in
which an alleged offender is found to either prosecute or extradite him. 16
In one respect, however, we have not progressed, and seem to have
regressed: those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and
terrorism, still go unpunished. They walk free, with impunity, and in
some cases are even courted by heads of state and honored with the most
prestigious awards that the international community can bestow.
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, an International Criminal
Tribunal has been established to try those responsible for war crimes and
establishing themselves asjus cogens); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather Than the States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1982) (noting that
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, as well as about fifty additional declarations and conventions
concerning issues such as discrimination against women and racial discrimination, have become a
part of international customary law).
7. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
11081, 1315 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention] .
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S .T. 1641 , 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hijacking Convention] .
9. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S . 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 [hereinafter
Sabotage Convention].
10. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) [hereinafter Maritime Terrorism Convention] .
11 . Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167 [hereinafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention] .
12. As of January 1, 1996, -157 States had ratified the Hijacking Convention, supra note 8;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 326-27 (1996); 157 States had ratified the Sabotage
Convention, supra note 9, at 327-28; 94 States had ratified the Internationally Protected Persons
Convention, supra note 11, at 441-42; 76 States had ratified the Hostage Convention, supra note
7, at 442; and 32 States had ratified the Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, at 398.
13. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 2; Sabotage Convention, supra note 9,
art. 1; Hostage Convention, supra note 7, art. 1; Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10,
art. 3.
14. See Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, art 2.
15. See e.g., Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 2, 22 U.S .T . at 1646, 860 U.N.T.S.
110.
16. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 7; Sabotage Convention, supra note 9,
art. 7; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, art. 7; Hostage Convention,
supra note 7, art. 8; Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, art. 10.
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crimes against humanity. 11 A number of persons, including prominent
leaders in the conflict, responsible for unspeakable atrocities, have been
indicted. 11 But, they have not been apprehended and brought to trial. 19
There appears to be great reluctance to do s0. 20 Although they have been
barred from running for office, and display of their pictures has been
prohibited, those seeking office showed empty frames to convey the
message that they identify with and have the support of these leaders
whose image was barred. 21
The question of whether the leaders should be prosecuted has been
the subject of scholarly debate, with some commentators taking the
position that perhaps we should forego prosecution. 22 For example,
Professor Ruth Wedgwood stated,
[i]t may not be possible to bring about a peace settlement
in the fonner Yugoslavia if the Tribunal is going forward
with active prosecutions of the state leaders of the
belligerent parties . . . . You may need to accept a punto
final, and sacrifice the prosecutorial interest in general
deterrence for the sake of future peace. 23
She suggests that "the slow start. of the Tribunal reflects a fear that the
Tribunal's work could impede the peace process. "24
The picture is even bleaker with respect to those responsible for
terrorist acts . No international tribunal has been established to try
terrorists who have killed innocent men, women, and children. Although
17. See U.N. SCOR, Res. 827, May 25, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203.
18. See William Drozdiak, Top Serbs Charged With War Crimes, WASH. POST, July 26,
1995, at Al (reporting the tribunals indictment of Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his
top military commander, Ratlco Mladic) .
19. See Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1 (noting that only seven of 74 people indicted by the
tribunal for war crimes are in custody, none of whom are leaders).
20. See Philip Shenon, Mixed Signals on Bosnia War Crime Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
1996, at Al (discussing statements by Pentagon officials that NATO commanders are reluctant to
step up efforts to capture accused war criminals because arrests might endanger peacekeeping
forces).
21. See Chris Hedges, Karadl.ic Is Out of Sight, But Not Out of Voters Minds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at AlO.
22. See Ruth Wedgwood, Symposium, War Crimes Bosnia and Beyond: War Crimes in
the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA . 1. INT'L L.
267, 273 (1994); Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM . 1. INT'L L. 500
(1994).
23 . Wedgwood, supra note 22, at 274-75 .
24. Id.
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an International Criminal Court may finally be established, its jurisdiction
may not include the acts made criminal by the various terrorist
conventions. The draft statute provides for such jurisdiction, 25 but the
United States is apparently opposed, 26 notwithstanding that in the
Antiterrorism Act of 1986 Congress urged the President to work towards
"establishing an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists. " 21
Not only is there no international tribunal to try those responsible
for major terrorist attacks but, unlike the situation in Bosnia, they continue
in leadership positions. Let me give you two examples.
On the evening of March 1, 1973, Cleo A. Noel, Jr., the United
States Ambassador to the Sudan, and George C. Moore, the United States
Charge d' Affaires, were taken hostage at a reception at the Saudi Arabian
embassy in Khartoum. 28 Late the following night they were brutally beaten
and machine-gunned to death. 29 A Belgian diplomat, Guy Eid, was also
killed . A Jordanian diplomat who had been taken hostage was released. 30
The President of the Sudan immediately made public evidence showing
that the operation had been carried out by Fatah (the Palestine Liberation
Organization faction founded and headed by Yasir Arafat), including a
written copy of the plans for the operation, which had been found in the
desk drawer of the top Fatah official in Khartoum. 31
In 1985, it was reported that the United States had information
from reliable sources that Yasir Arafat played a key role in orchestrating
the operation and gave his personal approval for the execution of Noel and
Moore. According to these sources, Arafat and other Palestine Liberation
Organization officials were directing the assassins from Fatah headquarters

25 . Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 2 May C 22 July 1994, at 51, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess ., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Art. 20(e) and Annex. See also, Forty-Sixth
Session, Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 2 May C 22 July 1994, at 51 , U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess. , Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Art. 20(e) and Annex. See also, id. at
Appendix II.
26 . Id.
27. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399,
§120l(d), 100 Stat. 853, 896 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2331).
28 . See Joshua Muravchik, Arresting Arafat: A. Warrant for the PLO Chief? , THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1985, at 12.
29. Id.
30. Richard Lyons, President Declares Killers Must Be Brought to Justice, N.Y . TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1973 at Al-A2. WASH . POST, Mar. 4, 1973, at Al , A22-A23 .
31. See Muravchik, supra note 28 .
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in Beirut, and those holding Noel and Moore did not kill them "until
receiving specific code-worded instructions" from Beirut. 32
It was further reported that "United States intelligence possessed a
taped intercept of Arafat personally ordering the Khartoum murders. " 33
Walter Vernon, then United States ambassador to the United Nations and
deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the
Khartoum murders, stated in an interview in 1985, that he had been told of
the existence of such a tape. Although he did not know Arabic and had
not personally heard the tape, he said the existence of the tape "was
common knowledge at the time, among all sorts of people in the
government. " 34
Charles Lichtenstein, deputy United States representative to the
United Nations under Jean Kirkpatrick35 and others urged the Attorney
General to issue a warrant for Arafat's arrest. Arafat was, however, not
indicted by the United States, nor did the United States seek his
extradition. 36 The Justice Department took the position that because the
United States legislation giving United States federal courts jurisdiction to
try someone for the murder of United States diplomats abroad was adopted
after the Khartoum killings, prosecution of Yasir Arafat in the United
States was barred by the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution. 37
The validity of that conclusion is open to serious questions. The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the ex post facto clause to bar
prosecuting a person for an act that was "innocent when [it was] done. " 38
The killing of Noel and Moore was clearly not "innocent when it was

32. Gaylord Shaw, U.S. Urged to Seek Arafat's Indictment, L.A . TIMES, Dec. 13, 1985, at
part I, p .4.
33. See Muravchik, supra note 28.
34. Id.
35. See Shaw, supra note 32.
36. President Reagan did threaten to boycott the United Nations 40th AMiversary
commemoration in 1985 if Yasir Arafat was invited. See Elaine Sciolino, Reagan May Boycott
Fete at U.N. if Arafat Shows Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, at AlO; Elaine Sciolino, U.N.,
Facing Boycott Threat, Drops Effort to Invite Arafat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1985 at 1. In 1988
and 1990 the United States denied Arafat visas to enter the United States to address the U.N. See
Laurence McQuillan, U.S. Visa Denial For Arafat Sparks Fight Over U.N., REUTERS, Jan. 27,
1988; Paul Lewis, Arafat Seeks to Attend U.N. Council Debate, N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 1990, at
C12.
37 .. Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
(Apr. 21, 1986), reprinted in ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER, GLOBAL TERRORISM IN THE
DANGEROUS DECADE, 335-36 (1992) .
38 . See e.g., Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
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done." It was a crime under the municipal law of the Sudan39 and a
violation of one of the oldest and most fundamental principles of
international law: that the person of the ambassador is inviolate. 40 The
Supreme Court has also stated that the ex post facto clause applies to
substantive rules, not to procedural rules. ' 1 Although the Supreme Court
has never decided whether jurisdiction is substantive or procedural, an
analysis of the cases and of the policies underlying the ex post facto clause
leads to the conclusion that jurisdiction is procedural. The appropriate
action, if the United States wanted to prosecute Arafat, would have been to
obtain the indictment and to let the Court decide whether the prosecution
was or was not barred by the ex post facto clause.
International law clearly does not consider it a violation of ex post
facto to try a person before a court that did not have jurisdiction at the
time the act was committed. Neither the Nuremberg Tribunal, which tried
persons charged with committing war crimes during WWII, nor the
recently established Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunals even
existed at the time the acts for which the accused were or will be
prosecuted were committed.
Not only did the United States fail to indict Arafat or to request his
extradition, but in September 1993 the President of the United States,
whose ambassador he ordered murdered, welcomed Arafat to the White

39. Section 246 of the Sudan Penal Code of 1974 (Act No. 64), Offenses Against the
Person, defines culpable homicide as follows:
Whoever causes death by doing an act:
(a) with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
or (b) with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the
offence of culpable homicide . . . . To be deemed murder, the death of the deceased
must have been the probable consequence of the act . . . . Murder is punished with
death of [sic] imprisonment for life, with the possibility of a fine.
CARLETON W. KENYON, THE SUDAN : LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 23-24 (1984).
40. This rule is codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N .T.S. 95, which has been ratified by 175 States. U.S. Dept. of
State, Treaties in Force 324 (1994). Anicle 29 provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent
shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State
shall treat him with due respect and shall take appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his
person, freedom, or dignity ." Ste also, Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall .) 114, 119
(Pa. 1784); Legal Mechanisms to Combat Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986) (the statement of Harris Weinstein). Weinstein stated that in his view,
"substantial authority suppons the view that a post facto clause would not bar prosecution."
41. See e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) ("No Ex Post Facto violation
occurs if the change in the law is merely procedural") .
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House•2 and on December 10, 1994 he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize. 43 Mr. Kare Kristiansen resigned from the Nobel Peace Prize
Committee in protest. He said, "[H]is past is too filled with violence,
terrorism and bloodshed . . . . It will give the wrong signal to other
violent organizations .... "" But, the propriety of the award did not give
rise to a great deal of diplomatic or scholarly debate.
The other example involves Abu Abbas, who masterminded the
seizure of the Achille Lauro, an Italian flag ship. 45 Several hundred
passengers were held hostage and one, a crippled American man in a
wheelchair, was killed and thrown overboard. 46 The hijackers eventually
surrendered in Egypt." Contrary to its obligations under the Hostage
Convention41 to either extradite or prosecute the offenders, 49 Egypt
permitted them to leave and even provided them with an Egyptian military
airplane for that purpose. 50
At President Reagan's direction, United States military airplanes
forced the Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers to land at a United States
military base in Italy. 51 The United States wanted to transfer the hijackers
42. Statements by Leaders at the Signing of the Middle East Pact, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1993, at A12. Arafat has been welcomed to the White House on several occasions since then.
43 . John Damton, P.L.O. Leader and
1994, at AS .

:i Israelis Share Award, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,

44. Nobel Panelist Resigns Over Arafat Award, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 15, 1994, at
A17 .
45 . John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 4()() Is Seized, N.Y . TIMES, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al. The
Achille Lauro seizure was the subject of numerous legal articles. For a discussion of whether the
seizure constituted piracy even though the motive was not monetary, see Gerald P. McGinley,
The Achille Lauro Affair - Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L . REV . 691 (1985)
(piracy) ; Gregory v. Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille
Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158 (1987) (piracy); Note, Towards a New Definition of
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723 (1986) (not piracy) ; see also,
Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1988); Malvina Halberstam, Terrorist
Acts Against and on Board Ships, 19 Is. YB. H. RTS. 331 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Extradition
and the U.S. Prosecution of the Achille Lauro Hostage Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20
VAND . J. TRANSNAT'LL. 235 (1987) .
46 . William E. Smith, The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 30-31.

41. Id.
48. Egypt ratified the Convention on December 17, 1979. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra
note 12, at 432.
49. Hostage Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(1), 18 I.L.M. at 1460.
50. George Russell, The U.S. Sends a Message; A Bold, Nonviolent Stroke Ends Four Days
of Horror and Humiliation , TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22.
51. Id. For a view highly critical of the United States action, See ANTONIO CASSESE,
TERRORISM, POLITICS AND LAW: THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR (1989). Cassese characterized
the United States action as "an act of shameless arrogance and a sign of political ineptitude," id.
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to a United States plane and to take them to the United States for trial, but
Italy refused to permit the United States to do so and also refused United
States extradition requests. However, all the perpetrators, except Abu
Abbas were tried, convicted and imprisoned in Italy. Abu Abbas, who
carried a diplomatic passport and, at the time, denied his involvement in
the Achille Lauro seizure, and claimed to be the one who negotiated the
release of the hostages, was permitted to leave Italy despite United States
protests. 52 He was later tried in absentia in Italy, convicted and sentenced
to life in prison. 53 A 115 page report prepared by the Italian magistrates
stated that the evidence against him was "multiple, unequivocal, and
overwhelming. " 54 It found that "Abbas conceived the action, selected its
actors, trained them for the specific enterprise, financed them" and
"provided them with the arms to conduct the action .... " 55 He was never
apprehended, however.
On April 22 of this year, Reuters reported that Abu Abbas,
"emerging from hiding for the first time since the 1985 hijacking, " 56 held a
press conference in Gaza, surrounded "by some of his old fighters and by
armed bodyguards, " 57 in which he acknowledged his role in the Achille
Lauro seizure and referred to the murder of Klinghoffer as a "mistake. " 53
The following day, Congressman Saxton and several other members of
Congress wrote to the Attorney General urging the extradition of Abu
Abbas for trial in the United States. 59 On April 30, the Senate passed a
resolution, ninety-nine to zero, also urging the Attorney General to seek

at 78, and refers to the United States request for the provisional arrest of Abu Abbas as "how the
super power 'bullied' Italy." Id. at 88. For a review of the book, taking issue with Cassese's
positions, see Malvina Halberstam, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1991).
52. See George Russell, The Price of Success; Reagan's Coup Breeds Anger in Egypt,
Crisis in Italy, Disarray in Diplomacy, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 22.
53. Andrew Hurst, Three Life Sentences in Achille Lauro Verdict, REUTERS, July 10,
1986.
54. From letter by Congressmen Saxton, Forbes, Ackerman, and Engel, to U.S. Attorney
General Janet Reno (on file with the author).

55. Id.
56. Wafa Amr, Palestinian Achille lAuro Mastermind Favours Peace, REUTERS, Apr. 22,
1996.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Letter from Congressman Jim Saxton, Michael P. Forbes, Gary L . Ackerman, and
Eliot L . Engel to Attorney General Janet Reno, dated Apr. 23, 1996 (copy on file with the
author).
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his extradition to the United States for trial for the murder of Klinghoffer. 60
Three months later, the Attorney General's Office sent a reply to
Congressman Saxton. After apologizing (but giving no reason for the
three-month delay in responding), the letter from an Assistant Attorney
General, stated:
The applicable statute of limitations at the time of the
crime was 5 years. Further, we are unable to meet the
standard for flight from justice necessary to stay the statute
of limitations. The United States, consequently, does not
have a basis to seek the extradition of Abu Abbas for trial
in this country. 61
While the Justice Department is correct that the applicable statute
of limitations for hostage taking at the time was five years, 62 the law also
provides that "[n]o statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing
from justice. " 63 The letter does not indicate the basis for the Justice
Department's conclusion that it is "unable to meet the standard for flight
from justice to stay the statute of limitations." However, earlier statements
by the Justice Department suggested that the tolling statute did not apply
because there was no outstanding arrest warrant or indictment.
There is no requirement that there be an outstanding arrest warrant
or indictment for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Numerous cases,
spanning over 150 years, have held that a person may be fleeing from
justice, even though no process was issued against him. 64 A memorandum
prepared by the Congressional Research Service, also disagreed with the
Attorney General's conclusion that the tolling provision was inapplicable.
After reviewing the applicable law on this point, the memorandum
concluded, "[t]rom this, it would appear that section 3290 would operate
60. S. Res. 253, 104th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 30, 1996. A similar resolution, introduced in
the House of Representatives, was referred to the Committee on International Relations. H. Res.
444, 104th Cong. 2d Sess., May 29, 1996.
61. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, to Congressman Saxton (July
23, 1996) (copy on file with the author).
62. 18 U.S.C.S. §3282 (Law . Co-op. 1993), amended by 18 U.S.C.S. §3286 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1996). The statute of limitations for hostage taking is now eight years. 18 U.S.C.S.
§3286 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). Moreover, if a hostage is killed, the penalty is life
imprisonment or death . 18 U.S.C. §1201(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). There is no statute of
limitations for capital crimes. 18 U.S.C.S. §3281 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). However, the
longer statute of limitations and increased penalty cannot be applied to crimes committed earlier
as that would violate the ex post facto clause.
63 . 18 u.s.c. §3290.
64. See e.g., United States v. White, F. Cas. No. 16675 (CC Dist. Col. 1836); United
States v. Fonseca-Machado, 53 F.3d 1242 (llth Cir. 1995).
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The memorandum

The hijackers forced the Achille La,uro to sail to Egypt
rather than Israel. Abbas' failure to tum himself over to
Italian authorities would probably be sufficient to trigger
3290 by itself. Moreover, he could hardly be ignorant of
American efforts to arrest him. The plane on which he
was a passenger was forced to land at a NATO base in
Sicily by American fighter planes and American authorities
only reluctantly allowed Italian ·authorities to take custody
of him there. There is no evidence Abbas has made any
effort to make himself available to American or Italian
authorities since his departure from Italy, in fact the
opposite seems to .[be] more readily apparent. 66
To the best of my knowledge neither Italy nor the United States has
requested the Palestinian Authority to hand over Abu Abbas, and he
continues as a member of the Palestine National Council.
A number of others responsible for terrorist attacks on innocent
civilians, including some who have been convicted, serve in high positions
in the Palestinian Authority. Abu Bain, convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment for placing a bomb in a trash can near a bus stop in
Tiberias, Israel that killed two sixteen year-old boys and injured thirty-six
other children and adults,6' was released by Israel, pursuant to an
undertaking in the Oslo Accords, and is now the Comptroller for the
Palestinian Authority. 68
The mother of Nachshon Wachsman, who was kidnapped and
tortured by terrorists before he died, wrote:

65. Memorandum from Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Service,
to Congressman Jim Saxton 9(CRS/7) (Sept. 27, 1996) (on file with the author) .
66 . Id.
67. Following the attack, he fled to the United States and was arrested in Chicago. The
extradition proceedings, in which he was represented by Ramsey Clark, a former United States
Attorney General, took over two years, including a hearing before a United States magistrate and
a United States district coun, Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1980), and review by
the Coun of Appeals, Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the
anti-American atmosphere that prevailed at the U.N. at the time and led to a General Assembly
Resolution condemning the United States for extraditing Abu Eain, see Allan Gerson, The
Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology - America at United Nations 198/-1985
(1991), at 77~78, quoted in, Malvina Halberstam, Book Review, 14 CARDOZO L. REV . 407, at
409 (1992) .
68. Alon Lie!, An Impossible Question, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at 5.
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In October 1994, after being ki~napped and held hostage
for six days by Hamas terrorists, our third son Nachshon
was murdered. The man who masterminded our son's
kidnapping walks the streets of Gaza freely. Indeed, he
was a member of the Palestinian Authority negotiating
team who met with the approval of our government. This
is an obscenity, a mockery, and a travesty of justice. It is
a distortion of the concept of peace. 69
Of course there are differences between the prosecution of those
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bosnia and
those responsible for terrorist acts. But, 1) both involve conduct that is
criminal under international law and that states are required to prosecute
and punish with severe penalties, and 2) both involve offenders in a
position to further or impede a precarious peace process.
While the legal obligation to prosecute and the desirability of such
prosecution has been the subject of scholarly debate in the context of the
conflict in Bosnia, 10 and with respect to repressive regimes replaced by
more democratic governments,7 1 there has been almost no discussion of the
desirability or legal obligation to prosecute terrorists who can effect the
peace negotiations. n Should we prosecute those responsible for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or terrorism when doing so may impede
the peace process?
It is not an easy question. It can be argued, with some force, that
it is more important to establish peace than to pursue those responsible for
past crimes. We should be aware, however, that a decision not to
prosecute those in a position to influence the peace negotiations will not
foreclose prosecution in a few isolated cases only. Those responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or major terrorist acts will generally
be in leadership positions and, absent complete surrender, as was true for
Nazi Germany after World War II, will generally be in a position to
further or impede the peace. Thus, a decision to forego prosecution when
69. Esther Wachsman, And Justice Wept, JERUSALEM POST INT'L ED., Mar. 30, 1996, at
10.
70. See Wedgwood, supra note 22; D'Amato, supra note 22; Jordan J. Paust, Applicability
of International CriminalLaws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POLICY, 499 (1994); Jordan J. Paust, Letter to thi Editor, 88 AM . J. INT'L L. 715 (1994) .
71. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti , 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. (1996); Diane F. Orentlicher, Symposium,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE
L. J. 2537 (1991).
72. But see Louis Rene Beres, International Law Requires Prosecution, Not Celebration of
Arafat, 71 U . DET. MERCY L. REV . 569 (1994) .
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it might endanger the peace process would preclude most prosecutions, or
at least, the most important prosecutions. Permitting those responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism to go unpunished will
undermine the moral force and the deterrent effect of those laws; it will
effectively vitiate those laws.
It is a question that should engage the attention of scholars and
statesmen, not be decided by default, as is being done in Bosnia by the
failure to apprehend those charged, and as is being done with Yasir Arafat
and Abu Abbas, by reliance on dubious technical arguments to justify the
failure to indict and seek extradition. Supreme Court Justice Breyer
recently stated that the importance of Nuremberg was that it established the
principle "that persons responsible for inhumanity toward man will be held
accountable for their crimes and brought to justice. " 13 What we do about
bringing to trial Radovan Karadzik, Ratko Mladic, Yasir Arafat and Abu
Abbas, will determine our continued commitment to that principle.

73 . Justice Stephen Breyer, Address Before the International Association of Jewish Jurists
and Lawyers (June 20, 1996), in NEWSLETTER, Fall 1996, at 2.

